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COMMENT
STRICT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
1983 FOR MUNICIPAL DEPRIVATIONS
OF FEDERAL RIGHTS?: OWEN V. CITY OF
INDEPENDENCE
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the Act)1 was
enacted to guard against violations of federal rights by "persons"
acting "under color of" state law.2 In Monell v. New York City
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)).
As presently codified, section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
dictioii thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93
Stat. 1284.
Sometimes called the "Ku Klux Klan Act," the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted to
quell civil unrest in the south in the post-Civil War period. See Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665-68 (1978). See generally Note, Developments in the
Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1137-90 (1977); Note, Govern-
mental Liability Under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment After Monell, 53 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 66, 68-79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Governmental Liability]. Urging Con-
gress to adopt legislation to correct these evils, President Ulysses S. Grant stated:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States ... rendering life and prop-
erty insecure .... That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of
state authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United
States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergen-
cies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judg-
ment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the en-
forcement of all law in all parts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-73
(1961).
The express purpose of the Act was to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 240 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 171. The debates surrounding the passage
of the Act also demonstrate three nonexpress purposes for the legislation. See CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871). First, by providing a means of redress in the federal courts,
Congress intended it to "override certain kinds of state laws." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
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Department of Social Services,' the Supreme Court held that mu-
nicipal corporations were "persons" within the coverage of section
19831 and that local governments, therefore, were liable under the
statute for official acts, resulting in constitutional injury, if per-
formed in furtherance of governmental "policy or custom."5 The
Monell Court declined to rule, however, on whether municipalities
were entitled to a qualified immunity from suit under section
1983.6 Recently, in Owen v. City of Independence, the Supreme
Court refined the scope of municipal liability under Monell, hold-
ing that a municipal defendant in a section 1983 suit will not be
accorded a qualified immunity based on the good faith of its
officials."
George D. Owen was employed by the city of Independence,
173. Secondly, the Act was meant to provide "a remedy where state law was inadequate."
Id. Finally, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress aimed "to provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice."
Id. at 174; accord, District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. at 426-29. Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has remarked that the Act was meant to ensure enforcement of constitutional
rights in any state that refused or was unable to enforce its own laws. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. at 175-76. See generally Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning
of "Policy or Custom," 79 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 307-15 (1979).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 688-89.
Id. at 690, 694-95. In Monell, the plaintiffs brought a section 1983 suit challenging an
official New York City policy that required pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence from their jobs when they reached the fifth month of pregnancy-a practice which
had previously been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Id. at 660-61 (citing
Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)). The district court held for the defendants
and the court of appeals affirmed, relying on Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961),
wherein the Supreme Court held that municipalities were not "persons" within the meaning
of section 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 661-62. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court and held for the plaintiffs, expressly
overruling Monroe insofar as it excluded municipal corporations from the meaning of the
word "persons" in section 1983. Id. at 664-89. Under Monell, local governments can be party
defendants in section 1983 suits "for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where...
the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's of-
ficers." Id. at 690. See generally Note, Civil Rights-Local Government-Local Govern-
ments Can Be Sued Directly Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Where Unconstitutional Action is
Pursuant to Governmental Custom or Implements Official Policy, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REV.
145, 151 (1978).
' 436 U.S. at 695. Monell "express[ed] no views on the scope of any municipal immu-
nity beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an abso-
lute immunity .... " Id. at 701. The Court noted, however, that a municipality would not
be liable under the statute on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 691.
" 445 U.S. 622 (1980), rev'g, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'g in part, 421 F. Supp.
1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
1 445 U.S. at 638.
1980] STRICT LIABILITY
Missouri for an indefinite term as its chief of police.' When certain
irregularities were discovered in the records of the police depart-
ment's property room,10 the city manager initiated an internal in-
vestigation into the administration and control of the room." The
investigative report found "no evidence of any criminal acts or of
any violation of state or municipal law in the administration of the
property room,"1 2 but facts suggesting mismanagement mvere re-
vealed.1 3 When he refused to resign," Owen was fired without a
hearing and without being informed of the reasons for his dis-
missal"' pursuant to a city ordinance authorizing the discharge of
municipal employees "for the good of the service.""
9 Id. at 625. Owen did not have a written contract of employment with the city and was
not subject to a tenure system. 421 F. Supp. at 1114.
,0 445 U.S. at 625. The management of the property room was questioned when a gun,
shown as destroyed in property room records, was found in the possession of a felon. Id.
" Id. Owen initially headed the probe, but the city manager, Lyle Alberg, soon shifted
the responsibility to the city's department of law. Id.
2 Id. at 625-26.
Is Id. In a statement to the city council, one councilman remarked:
"The reports show that numerous firearms properly in the police department
custody found their way into the hands of others including undesirables and were
later found by other law enforcement agencies.
"Reports whow [sic] that narcotics held by the Independence Missouri Chief of
Police have mysteriously disappeared. Reports also indicate money has mysteri-
ously disappeared. Reports show that traffic tickets have been manipulated. The
reports show inappropriate requests affecting the police court have come from
high ranking police officials. Reports indicate that things have occurred causing
the unusual release of felons. The reports show gross inefficiencies on the part of a
few of the high ranking officers of the police department."
Id. at 627 n.5.
14 Id. at 625. Alberg asked Owen to step down as police chief and accept another posi-
tion within the department. Id. It was clear, however, that a refusal to comply with this
request would result in Owen's discharge. Id.
15 Id. at 629. Prior to his discharge, Owen, on the advice of counsel, requested written
notice of any charges against him. Id. at 626-27 & n.4. The notice of termination, however,
stated merely that he was being dismissed pursuant to section 3.3(1) of the city charter. Id.
at 629; see note 16 infra.
11 Id. at 625. Paul Roberts, a city council member who had obtained a copy of the
investigative report, id. at 627, read a statement at the regularly scheduled meeting of the
city council charging Owen with misappropriating police department property and with
gross inefficiency in his management of the property room. Id. at 627-28; see note 13 supra.
Subsequently, a motion urging the city manager to take action against those involved in the
alleged misconduct was proposed by Roberts and passed easily by the council. Id. at 628-29.
Section 3.3(1) of the city's charter vested the city manager with the power to "[a]ppoint,
and when deemed necessary for the good of the service, lay off, suspend, demote, or remove
all directors, or heads of administrative departments and all other administrative officers
and employees of the city ..... Id. at 625 n.2. The action by the city manager pursuant to
the charter provision came just one day after the city council's resolution. Id. at 629. While
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:153
Owen brought suit under section 1983 against the city man-
ager, the city council and the city of Independence, alleging that
the defendants' failure to afford him notice of the reasons for his
discharge and a name-clearing hearing deprived him of due pro-
cess. 17 The district court held for the defendants, reasoning that
section 1983 did not create a claim against the city."' The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying "a post-Monell interpre-
tation of section 1983,"19 reversed the lower court decision,2 0 inso-
far as it denied a section 1983 claim against the municipality.2 1 It
affirmed the district court judgment for the defendants, however,
finding that the city of Independence was entitled to a qualified
good-faith immunity from liability under section 1983.22
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that local
governments do not enjoy a qualified immunity from section 1983
liability based on the good faith of municipal officials.23 Justice
the contents of the investigative report were not made public, id. at 630, the events culmi-
nating in Owen's termination received prominent coverage in the local press, id. at 629.
17 Id. at 630. The complaint also alleged violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights
under the fourteenth amendment. 421 F. Supp. at 1112. Money damages in the form of
backpay and attorneys' fees were sought, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. 445
U.S. at 630.
18 Id. at 630 n.10. The trial court ruled that the complaint did state a claim for relief
under the fourteenth amendment. Id.; see note 17 supra. Reaching the merits of the consti-
tutional claim, however, the court determined that "the [plaintiff's] discharge did not de-
prive him of any constitutionally protected property interest," since, as a nontenured em-
ployee, he had no property interest in his continued employment. Moreover, the court
added that the circumstances of his discharge did not impugn his professional reputation so
as to implicate any liberty interests. 445 U.S. at 630 n.10; see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 569-79 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972).
19 Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 622
(1980). The Eighth Circuit's decision was made on remand from the Supreme Court, 438
U.S. 902 (1978), with instructions to give the Owen case "further consideration in light of
[the] supervening decision in Monell ... ." 100 S. Ct. at 1406; see notes 3-6 and accompa-
nying text supra.
20 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
21 Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d at 337. Both parties initially had appealed
the district court decision in Owen. See 445 U.S. at 631 n.11. Before the Eighth Circuit for
the first time, the appellate court affirmed the district court's holding that the city was not a
person within the meaning of section 1983. Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 933
(8th Cir. 1977). It reversed the district court's decision on the plaintiff's fourteenth amend-
ment claim, however, see note 18 supra, finding that the plaintiff had been deprived of a
liberty interest-his reputation was stigmatized-without due process of law. 560 F.2d at
937. Subsequently on remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit found it unneces-
sary to rely on this liberty interest analysis since Monell "permit[ted] Owen to sue the City
of Independence directly ... " 589 F.2d at 337.
22 Id. at 338.
23 445 U.S. at 624-25. Prior to the Monel decision, resolution of the municipal immu-
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Brennan, writing for the majority,2 4 examined the language of sec-
tion 1983, the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the
1871 Act, and subsequent judicial interpretations of the statute.
The Court noted that the text of the statute does not provide for
immunity from suit.2" Furthermore, Justice Brennan concluded
that the legislative history of the Act indicated a congressional in-
tention that it be read expansively.2" Thus, the Court reasoned,
only where an immunity was deeply rooted in the common law and
was "compatible with purposes of the Civil Rights Act" would
congressional intent to extend immunity under section 1983 be
found.27 The majority determined that municipalities, traditionally
treated as natural persons by the courts and generally subject to
full liability for tortious acts,2 8 were not entitled to a good-faith
nity issue would not have been proper since municipalities were accorded absolute immu-
nity from suit under section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961).
24 The majority consisted of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
vens. Justice Powell filed a dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist joined.
25 445 U.S. at 635. The Court stated:
By its terms, § 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no
immunities.".. . Its language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of
any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the act im-
poses liability upon "every person" who, under color of state law or custom, "sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws."
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
11 Id. at 635-36. The Court quoted Representative Shellabarger, sponsor of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 in the House of Representatives. Id. at 636. Introducing the proposed
Act in the House, the Congressman remarked that the statute should be "liberally and be-
neficently construed," and that "[i]t would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous
were this not the rule of interpretation." Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
App. 68 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger)).
" 445 U.S. at 638. The Court previously had found some form of immunity from suit
under section 1983 to exist for individuals who were sued in their capacity as governmental
officials. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)(prison officials); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)(state prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975)(school board members); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)(legislators).
" 445 U.S. at 641 (citing Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511 (1837)). In Thayer,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that if a municipality performed an
unlawful act
either by express vote of the city government, or by the nature of the duties and
functions with which they are charged, by their offices, to act upon the general
subject matter, and especially if the act was done with an honest view to obtain
for the public some lawful benefit or advantage, reason and justice obviously re-
quire that the city, in its corporate capacity, should be liable to make good the
damage sustained by an individual, in consequence of the acts thus done.
36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 515-16; see, e.g., Horton v. Ipswich, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 488, 489, 492
19801
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immunity under section 1983.29
Several policy arguments also were advanced by the majority
in support of its refusal to recognize a section 1983 immunity
based on the good faith of municipal officials.30 First, since the
Civil Rights Act was enacted to protect individuals from injury
caused by official abuse of state law, the Court reasoned that the
government, as public representative and role model, should not be
permitted to avoid the consequences of its wrongdoing by assertingimmunity.3 1 Secondly, Justice Brennan asserted that municipal lia-
bility under section 1983 would create an incentive for government
officials who doubt the legality of a proposed action to choose an
alternative course of action that would ensure the federal rights of
their constituency. 2 Finally, with little comment or support the
majority contended that its decision was consistent with contem-
porary tort theories which no longer impose liability solely on the
basis of fault.3 8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, like the majority, ana-
lyzed the legislative history and policy underlying section 1983. 3
(1853); Elliot v. Concord, 27 N.H. 204, 208-09 (1853); Lee v. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N.Y.
442, 448-51 (1869); Town Council of Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio 229, 230-31 (1849); Hurley
v. Town of Texas, 20 Wis. 634, 637-38 (1866).
29 445 U.S. at 650. The Court rejected the common-law distinction between a munici-
pality's "proprietary" and "ministerial" acts, which had been used to create municipal im-
munity in certain instances. Id. at 644-50. First, the Court argued that when the municipal-
ity was found to be a "person" under section 1983, "whatever vestige of the State's
sovereign immunity the municipality possessed" was abolished. Id. at 647-48. Secondly, the
Court asserted that since "a municipality has no 'discretion' to violate the Federal Constitu-
tion," id. at 649, the discretionary immunity doctrine, "which had insulated sovereigns from
liability for discretionary acts," no longer applied. Id.
30 Id. at 650-56.
31 Id. at 651. The Court concluded that "owing to the qualified immunity enjoyed by
most governmental officials,. . . many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left reme-
diless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith defense." Id. (citation omitted).
31 Id. at 651-52. The Court noted that the policies supporting section 1983 immunity
for governmental officials were not applicable to municipal liability. Id. at 652-56. First, the
policy of insulating a public officer from liability for acts he is required to perform is not
applicable when an award of damages "comes not from the official's pocket, but from the
public treasury." Id. at 654. Moreover, municipal liability would not unduly restrict govern-
mental decisionmaking processes since "[t]he inhibiting effect is significantly reduced, if not
eliminated,. . . when the threat of personal liability is removed." Id. at 655-56.
33 Id. at 657.
Id. at 658-83 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also argued that the majority
had reached the wrong conclusion on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 658-64 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). Noting that an employee-at-will is entitled to a hearing upon discharge
only if the circumstances surrounding his firing had impugned the employee's professional
reputation, id. at 662 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
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Justice Powell reasoned, however, that since municipal corpora-
tions had absolute immunity from suit at common law, the failure
to extend a qualified immunity to municipalities under the statute
"abandon[ed] any attempt to harmonize § 1983 with traditional
tort law." 35 Moreover, the dissent found the policy arguments of
the majority unpersuasive, stating that "[i]mportant public policies
support the extension of a qualified immunity to local govern-
ments."' 6 Finally, Justice Powell expressed the apprehension that,
under the majority's rule, municipalities might be subjected to
"strict liability" for violation of an individual's federal rights.8 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Owen disallowing a qualified
good-faith immunity to local governments appears to be consistent
with the history of governmental immunity and the Court's prior
decisions under section 1983. At common law, local governments
generally were not accorded qualified immunity from suit.3 8
Rather, municipalities either were immune from liability abso-
572-75 (1972), the dissent found that the actions of the city in dismissing Owen did not
impose a "stigma on [the] petitioner that would require a 'name clearing' hearing under the
Due Process Clause." 445 U.S. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell concluded that
the city manager's conduct was within his statutory authority to discharge city employees,
and thus, did not infringe on Owen's liberty. Id. at 664 (Powell, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 667 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowledged that section 1983 does
not on its face provide for immunity from suit. Id. at 666 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 25
and accompanying text supra. The absence of an express legislative grant, however, was not
deemed to be dispositive. Instead, Justice Powell observed that section 1983 "'is to be read
in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in deroga-
tion of them."' 445 U.S. at 666 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 418 (1976)). Justice Powell also concluded that "the legislative record suggest[ed]
that the Members of the 42d Congress would have been dismayed by this ruling." Id. at 670-
71 (Powell, J., dissenting). Relying on the debates in the Senate in 1871, the dissent cited
two concerns of the legislators which would favor a grant of a qualified immunity to munici-
palities: First, their fear that strict liability "could bankrupt local governments" by holding
municipalities vicariously liable for the riotous acts of their constituents and, secondly, the
possibility that liability might be imposed upon a municipality when it did not know that a
certain constitutional right existed. Id. at 672-73 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 763 (1871) (Sen. Casserly), Id. at 762 (Sen. Stevenson)).
36 Id. at 667 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that under the separation of
powers doctrine "some municipal decisions should be at least presumptively insulated from
judicial review." Id. at 667-68 (Powell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Powell argued,
the Court's decision would restrict independent local governing by exposing municipalities
to liability without affording them the knowledge of which acts may be deemed unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 1425 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 669-70 (Powell, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
445 U.S. at 638-40; see Horton v. Ipswich, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 488, 489, 492 (1853);
Elliot v. Concord, 27 N.H. 204, 208-09 (1853); Lee v. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N.Y. 442, 448-
51 (1869); Town Council of Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio 299, 320-21 (1849); Hurley v. Town
of Texas, 20 Wis. 634, 637-38 (1866).
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lutely or were held fully accountable without any immunity for
their malfeasance.39 Thus, the Owen Court was not presented with
a well-established common-law principle from which to imply a
good-faith immunity for municipalities from liability under section
1983.40 Moreover, Owen comports with the modern trend in section
1983 jurisprudence to expand the coverage of the statute.41 In Mo-
nell, the Supreme Court evinced a policy in favor of recompensing
plaintiffs injured by the actions of municipalities, as well as by the
acts of other individuals.42 Since the affirmative defense of good
faith on the part of municipal governments43 may be especially dif-
ficult to disprove, a good-faith immunity for municipalities could
effectively frustrate this policy. 44
39 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
40 See 445 U.S. at 638; note 27 and accompanying text supra.
41 See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980) (section 1983 protects rights
established by federal statutory law as well as constitutional rights); Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)(municipal corporations are "persons" within
meaning of section 1983). The modern trend to liberally interpret section 1983 contrasts
with the narrow interpretations characterizing early decisions under the statute. See Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)(municipal corporations are not persons within meaning of section 1983). See gener-
ally Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26
IND. L.J. 361, 363-66 (1951).
"' See 436 U.S. at 690-91; notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra. See generally
Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979); Govern-
mental Liability, supra note 1, at 66; Comment, Civil Rights: Discarding Section 1983 Mu-
nicipal Immunity-Is That Enough? 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 979 (1978).
43 Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1980).
"' See, e.g., Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1980); Bailey v. Lally, 481 F.
Supp. 203, 223-24 (D. Md. 1979); see notes 56-58 and accompanying text infra. At least one
commentator has suggested that if a municipality was given good faith immunity from sec-
tion 1983 suit, it could convert its qualified immunity into an absolute freedom from section
1983 liability. See Note, Municipal Immunity-Section 1983-Absolute Immunity With-
drawn-Qualified Immunity Left as a Possibility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 943, 953.
The difficulty of proving bad faith on the part of a local government is illustrated by
the Second Circuit decision in Sala v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979), va-
cated, 446 U.S. 903 (1980). The plaintiff was charged with a minor offense. Her summons,
however, was mailed to the wrong address, and when she did not timely respond to it, a
warrant was issued for her arrest. 604 F.2d at 208-09. Learning of this, the plaintiff volunta-
rily went to the police department, where she was handcuffed and subjected to a strip
search, "which included visual inspection of the genital and anal areas." Id. at 209. The
plaintiff then commenced suit against Suffolk County and several individuals. Id. Deciding
the case prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Owen, the Second Circuit found that the
county was entitled to a qualified good-faith immunity. Id. at 211. Cloaked with the immu-
nity, the county was found not liable:
The facts of this case present a situation wherein although the practice was in-
sensitive, demeaning and stupid, there was no evidence of bad faith on the part
of anyone charged with formulating or implementing the municipal policy, and
STRICT LIABILITY
The Owen Court's apparent sanction of strict municipal liabil-
ity for section 1983 violations, however, is more troublesome. The
Court did not explore the possibility of municipal liability based
on a lesser standard of care. It appears, however, that a strict lia-
bility standard for municipal violations of section 1983 not only is
unwarranted in light of the historical purpose of liability without
fault, but also is inconsistent with the realities and integrity of the
municipal government system. Moreover, an alternative theory of
municipal liability based on negligence has not been precluded by
section 1983 precedent. The balance of this Comment will examine
these issues.
Strict Liability: The Traditional Bases
The tort concept of strict liability is grounded on the notion
that, in some circumstances, one who causes injury to another
should be held accountable whether or not he is at fault.45 Al-
though liability without fault was imposed regularly at early com-
mon law,46 the modern tendency has been to find strict tort liabil-
ity on a more limited basis.47 Today, strict liability generally is
the case law as of the time of the incident involved here did not suggest that the
practice of strip searching which apparently had long been followed by many gov-
ernmental bodies, was unconstitutional.
Id. (emphasis added).
45 See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRm 492-549 (4th ed. 1971); Bohlen, The Rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298 (1911); Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort
Liability, 18 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1976); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1916). The
modem concept of strict liability was introduced in the mid-19th century in the English
case of Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265
(1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), in which the court held that a landowner will be liable
if injury occurs to another through the non-natural use of his land. See notes 48-49 and
accompanying text infra.
46 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 14.1 (1956); Epstein, supra note 45, at
152; Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 36 WASH. L. REv. 225, 225-
26 (1971).
47 Most modem courts premise tort liability upon the fault of the defendant. See, e.g.,
Stief v. J.A. Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453, 462 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 997
(1967); Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 1966); Harris v. Oro-
Dam Constructors, 269 Cal. App. 2d 911, 915, 75 Cal. Rptr. 544, 547 (1969); see W. PROSSER,
supra note 45, at 493; Peck, supra note 45, at 225. Where strict liability is imposed, it is
generally done as a matter of social policy. Huebner v. Hunter Packing Co., 59 Ill. App. 3d
563, 568, 375 N.E.2d 873, 877 (1977); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 344, 322
A.2d 440, 444 (1974); see United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th
Cir. 1978); Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 448, 368 N.E.2d 24, 27, 398
N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1977); Chandler v. Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 356, 569 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1977)
(en banc); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 865, 567 P.2d 218, 223 (1977) (en
19801
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imposed only if the defendant's activity is so abnormally danger-
ous or inappropriate as to pose a high risk of harm to others4 s or if,
as a matter of social policy, the defendant is deemed to be most
financially capable of bearing the cost of the plaintiff's injuries.49
Strict municipal liability is not justified under either of these
views. Municipal liability under section 1983 attaches only where
the plaintiff establishes that a "policy or custom" of the local gov-
erning unit deprives him of a federally protected right.50 Since the
legislative and policymaking processes usually entail careful delib-
eration and execution by municipal officials, it appears that local
"policy or custom" will rarely pose the sort of urgent danger which
traditionally has triggered strict liability. Rather, it is more likely
that the decisions of local lawmaking bodies will promote effective
municipal government, although, on occasion, injury may result to
a relatively small number of citizens.5 1 Finally, many local govern-
ments simply are not financially able to bear the expense of poten-
tially open-ended liability under section 1983.2
banc).
4' See, e.g., Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288, 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 878 (1972); Hall v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); In re Alamo Chem. Transp. Co., 320 F. Supp. 631, 634-38 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Garelli v.
Sterling-Alaska Fur & Game Farms, Inc., 25 Misc. 2d 1032, 1036, 206 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960). The American Law Institute has formulated the following
factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant's activity is abnormally danger-
ous so as to justify strict tort liability:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
" United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978); e.g.,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963). See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965). See gen-
erally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961).
50 See note 5 supra.
"I Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is
not a tort for government to govern.").
'2 See Blaydon & Gifford, Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1057,
1057; Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1531-43
(1977).
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1980] STRICT LIABILITY
A Negligence Standard: A Viable Alternative for Municipal
Liability
Both the language of section 1983 and the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 are silent as to the degree of culpabil-
ity necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the statute.53
Additionally, although it has been decided that the statute should
be read in harmony with traditional tort theory," pre-Owen courts
had reached no general agreement as to the state of mind that
would justify the imposition of section 1983 liability.5 The immu-
s' See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365-66, 385, 390
(1871); Kirkpatrick, Defining A Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State-of-
Mind Requirement, 46 CINN. L. REV. 45, 46 (1977).
u Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-57
(1967); Daniels v. Van De Venter, 382 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir. 1967); McClellan & Northcross,
Remedies and Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 18 DUQUESNE L. REV. 409,
411 (1980); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 7
(1974); Note, Civil Rights-Section 1983 Action Lies for Gross and Culpable Negligence, 49
N.C.L. REV. 337, 339-40 (1971).
Section 1983 is not coextensive, however, with traditional tort theory. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Santiago v. Yarde, 487 F. Supp. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Although the Supreme Court has found similarities between state tort law and sec-
tion 1983, it has stressed that the two are distinct. This notion was expressed in the leading
case of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). In Screws, an action was brought
against a police officer under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976)-the criminal counterpart to section
1983-alleging that the defendant beat and killed a handcuffed suspect for no apparent
reason. 325 U.S. at 92-93. On these facts the Court commented that a "[vliolation of local
law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded." Id. at 108. In a more
recent case, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court used the Screws reasoning to
justify a holding that a state officer's behavior does not automatically violate section 1983
when it constitutes a tort under state law. Id. at 699-700. See Levin, supra note 52, at 1489-
90; Nahmod, supra, at 13-32.
65 The general rule in the wake of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), see note 5
supra, is that "wilfulness" is not a prerequisite to section 1983 liability. See, e.g., Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1972); Daniels v. Van
De Venter, 382 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir. 1967); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1151
(N.D. Miss. 1980). But cf. Smith v. Dallas County Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 1324, 1337
(S.D. Ala. 1979) (motives and intent are crucial to a determination of whether section 1981
has been violated). Where a specific intent is required to establish a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights within the coverage of section 1983, however, the courts have insisted that
intentional or purposeful conduct be demonstrated. E.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F.
Supp. at 1151 (section 1983 plaintiff alleging deprivation of equal protection must prove
discriminatory intent on part of defendant); see Kirkpatrick, supra note 53, at 50-53. On the
other hand, some courts have imposed section 1983 liability only upon a showing of gross
negligence or deliberate indifference, e.g., Johnson v. Shaw, 609 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1980);
Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d
541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974)); Hoit v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir. 1974); Burns v. Sullivan,
473 F. Supp. 626, 629 (D. Mass. 1979); see Note, Civil Rights-Section 1983 Action Lies for
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nity decisions under section 1983, however, may provide some gui-
dance as to the standard of care to be applied to alleged violations
of the statute.
The standard upon which a qualified section 1983 immunity
has been premised contains both objective and subjective ele-
ments. As a general rule, a person otherwise entitled to a good-
faith defense under section 1983 will not be immune from suit "if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
... would violate the constitutional rights of [another]," or if he
acted "with malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constiti-
tional rights or other injury .... The courts consistently have
held that a defendant "reasonably should have known" that his
acts would constitute an actionable section 1983 deprivation only
where he has violated "clearly established" federal rights.57 Thus,
under these decisions, a defendant will not be charged with section
1983 liability unless there existed at the time he acted legal prece-
dent indicating that his actions would deprive an individual of his
Gross and Culpable Negligence, 49 N.C.L. Rv. 337 (1971), or according to a mere negli-
gence standard, e.g., Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1975); Stiltner v.
Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 421 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 997 (1967); Huey v. Barloga,
277 F. Supp. 864, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (dicta); see Schnapper, supra note 42, at 247-50. But
see Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Holmes v.
Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)); Ferguson v. Fleck, 480 F. Supp. 219, 221 (W.D. Mo.
1979). Moreover, even before Owen, a few courts had imposed strict liability for section 1983
violations. See Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: an Analy-
sis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 526, 527 (1977); Kirkpatrick, supra note 53, at 67-70. It
is suggested that these various approaches have evolved because, among other things, the
courts will not articulate a standard if another issue is dispositive of the case. E.g., Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); see Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980); note 59
infra.
" Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974); Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072, 1074 (1st Cir. 1979); Crowe v. Lucas,
595 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1979); Perez v. Rodriguez Boy, 575 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1978);
McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 914 (10th Cir. 1977); Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 221-
22 (D. Md. 1979); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1381-83 (D. Mass. 1979). See generally
Note, The Proposed Good Faith Test for Fourth Amendment Exclusion Compared to the
§ 1983 Good Faith Defense: Problems and Prospects, 20 Amz. L. Rav. 915 (1978). Inco-
porating its subjective elements, good faith has been defined as "[h]onesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry."
BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY 623 (5th ed. 1979); accord, Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d
187, 192, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1967); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 136, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287 (1973); Hulse v.
Sheriff, Clark County, 88 Nev. 393, 398, 498 P.2d 1317, 1320 (1972).
57 E.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975)); Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 712 (3d
Cir. 1978); Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 222-24 (D. Md. 1979).
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rights under federal law.58
Similarly, the Owen Court's refusal to recognize a qualified
good-faith immunity from suit under section 1983 does not man-
date that localities be held strictly liable for deprivations of federal
rights. It is su*ggested that a negligence standard for municipal lia-
bility would safeguard the federal rights of individuals without im-
pinging on the autonomy of local governing units.5 9 This negligence
standard would entail an examination of whether a municipality,
in the reasonable exercise of its governing powers, should have
opted for an alternative course of action in its legislation or custom
that would have more adequately protected the federal rights of
those affectedeo Under a negligence standard, therefore, a munici-
pality would be liable only for civil deprivations that were within
the reasonable contemplation of its legislators or policymakers; it
See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (1975); Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 712 (3d Cir.
1978); Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 222-24 (D. Md. 1979).
" See generally Schnapper, supra note 42, at 247-53. The courts have not squarely
evaluated a negligence standard for section 1983 violations. See Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d
83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980). In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), for example, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether negligent deprivation
of constitutional rights was redressable under section 1983. Id. at 559. The Court, however,
never reached the issue, reasoning instead that the defendants were entitled to a qualified
good-faith immunity and that the plaintiff's allegations of negligence were insufficient to
rebut the defense of good faith. Id. at 566. But see id. at 567-68 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). A
year later, in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the Supreme Court was again
presented with an opportunity to determine whether a negligence standard would suffice in
section 1983 actions. The Baker Court, noting that Procunier provided no guidance on this
issue, also did not reach the negligence question; rather, it decided the case on the basis of a
failure of the plaintiff to meet the "threshold" showing of a deprivation of constitutional
rights. Id. at 145-46. In dicta, however, the Court suggested:
Having been around this track once before in Procunier ... we have come to
the conclusion that the question whether an allegation of simple negligence is suf-
ficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 is more elusive than it appears at
first blush. It may well not be susceptible of a uniform answer across the entire
spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might be the subject of a
§ 1983 action.
Id. at 139-40.
" See Schnapper, supra note 42, at 247. The judge of conduct under negligence law
must weigh four separate factors: "(a) the likelihood that the conduct would cause injury,
(b) the magnitude of the possible injury, (c) the importance of the goal at which the conduct
is directed, and (d) the availability of alternative methods of achieving that goal." Id. at 248.
To apply this standard to section 1983, the only modification required would be to change
"injury" to constitutional injury. The most significant reason for using such a standard to
evaluate municipal activities, however, is that "liability would not be imposed retroactively
when an established constitutional precedent is overturned by the Supreme Court, since
prior to the decision involved there would have been little foreseeable risk of constitutional
injury." Id. at 248.
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would be insulated from liability for remote and unforeseeable vio-
lations which could not have been averted through the exercise of
reasonable care. 1 Such a standard would adequately protect the
federal rights of the municipality's citizens without unnecessarily
hindering its legislative and policymaking processes.
CONCLUSION
The Owen decision denying municipalities qualified immunity
from section 1983 suits clearly is in line with prior authority and
the intent of the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Thus,
where a municipal policy or custom deprives an individual of his
federal rights, the municipality will be liable for damages caused
thereby despite any allegation of good faith. Elimination of the
availability to local governments of qualified immunity, however,
should not result in imposition of strict liability on municipalities.
It is hoped that the judiciary will take note of this and will refuse
to impose section 1983 liability on a municipality for violation of
an individual's federal rights unless it is demonstrated that a rea-
sonably prudent governing body would have avoided the result by
utilizing an existing alternative course of action.
Ellen R. Dunkin
61 See note 60 supra.
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